* fix(xslt): bound template recursion so it fails gracefully, not with a crash
A recursive named template whose depth is driven by source data (e.g.
`<xsl:with-param name="n" select="count(//x)"/>`) could recurse without bound
and overflow the native stack (SIGBUS) on attacker-controllable input. Every
XSLT processor guards this (libxslt's xsltMaxDepth); PureXML did not.
Measurement first: source *nesting* depth is not the exposure. `transform`
parses the source at the default maxDepth (256) and there is no XSLT API that
accepts a pre-built tree, so the engine never sees a source deeper than ~255;
an identity transform of a 254-deep source completes normally on a normal
stack. The reachable crash is data-driven template recursion, which overflows
an 8 MB stack between ~400 and 600 levels.
Template-instantiation nesting (instantiateTemplate and builtInRule) is now
counted and capped at maxTemplateDepth; past it the guard latches, the
instantiation loops unwind, and `transform` throws
XSLTError.recursionLimitExceeded instead of crashing. The default (300, exposed
as PureXML.XSLT.defaultMaxTemplateDepth, overridable via a new maxTemplateDepth
parameter on transform) clears the parser's max source depth so a deep-source
identity transform still runs, while staying within an 8 MB main-thread stack
with margin. A stylesheet with deeper legitimate recursion raises the limit on
a correspondingly larger stack.
copyOf moved to XSLTSorting.swift to keep XSLTTransformer.swift within the file
length limit; it is unchanged (a whole-subtree copy that does not recurse on
depth). Guarded by XSLTRecursionLimitTests (run on a large-stack thread, since
the limit is above what swift-testing's Task stack holds). Full suite 1802 pass.
Part of #356; making the engine fully iterative (deep recursion succeeds, and
is safe on a small Task stack) remains tracked there.
* test(xslt): exclude the large-stack recursion tests on WASI
WASI is single-threaded and has no Foundation Thread/DispatchSemaphore, which
the recursion-limit tests need to exercise the guard on a stack large enough for
the limit (300) to fire before the stack overflows. Guard the file with
#if !os(WASI); the recursion guard itself is platform-independent pure Swift,
covered by the macOS and Linux runs.